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We first prove that ontological models of the quantum state which are capable of reproducing the Born prob-
ability rule and fall in the class of ψ-epistemic models are inconsistent with the Scho¨dinger time evolution.
We then model the ontic state space as a complex projective Hilbert space that embeds the projective Hilbert
space of quantum mechanics and define a minimalist epistemic state as an average over a set of “hidden states”
in the larger space. We show that such a model incorporates probability amplitudes and admits an epistemic
interpretation of quantum states. Finally, we prove a second theorem to show that such a model is compatible
with locality but ontic models are not.
Although quantum mechanics has reigned as an out-
standingly successful and accurate description of the
physical world for almost a century, the interpretation of
its state function has been of considerable debate since its
inception. Central to this debate have been entanglement,
measurement and violations of Bell-CHSH inequalities
by the quantum state, signatures which have been hailed
as its hallmarks [1–3]. Some have advocated a realist in-
terpretation while others have preferred a subjective or
epistemic interpretation. The most imperative question,
then, is whether the wavefunction is an objective entity
which is determined by the elements of reality or is a
state of knowledge about the underlying reality.
Recently a no-go theorem has been proved by Pusey-
Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) [4] with a couple of reasonable
assumptions to rule out a subjective (epistemic) interpre-
tations of the quantum state. In another work, it has been
shown, under the assumption of free-choice of measure-
ment settings, that only a realist or ontic interpretation of
the wavefunction is possible [5]. Lewis et al [6] have,
however, shown that if one drops the preparation inde-
pendence assumption and also slightly weakens the defi-
nition of an epistemic state, it is possible to have an epis-
temic interpretation of quantum states. Using continuity
and a weak separability assumption, Patra, Pironio and
Massar [7] have argued that epistemic states are incom-
patible with quantum theory. However, the situation is
far from clear and continues to attract physicists [8–13].
In this letter, we will first show (in Theorem-I below)
that certain ontological models that reproduce the Born
probability rule are inconsistent with the Schro¨dinger
evolution. Ontological models that are ψ-epistemic fall
in this class. This is a simple and powerful demonstration
of all previous results that aim to rule out ψ-epistemic
models. Our proof holds without any additional assump-
tion such as preparation independence, free-choice of
measurement settings, or weak separability.
Notwithstanding this, then, we ask whether it is still
possible to have an epistemic interpretation of quantum
state since it has been argued that such an interpretation
may be preferable on many counts [14]. We show that
if one suitably modifies the way probabilistic predictions
of quantum theory are reproduced in the ontic descrip-
tion, it is possible to retain its epistemic nature. Towards
that aim we introduce a certain structure of the ontic state
space and a suitable definition of quantum states. To be
specific, we postulate that the ontic state space is a com-
plex projective Hilbert space which embeds the complex
projective Hilbert space of quantum mechanics, and de-
fine a quantum state as an average over a small dense
range of unknown ontic states–which we call “hidden-
states”– in this larger space. We emphasize that we do
not use a probability distribution and an indicator func-
tion (response function) to reproduce Born’s probability
rule as is usually done. We directly relate quantum states
to ontic states through a probability amplitude. This is a
major departure from all the ontological models that ex-
ist in the literature. In some sense, such quantum states
are close to the ontic states but somewhat smeared. This
may be thought of as a “minimalist ψ-epistemic” model
which does not depart too much from reality and yet can
resolve many paradoxical features of the quantum world.
Furthermore, we prove a second theorem to show that
such an epistemic model is compatible with locality but
ontic models are not.
In order to have a clear perspective of ontological
models and their implications, it is important to state at
the outset some useful notions defined by Harrigan and
Spekkens [15] (henceforth referred to as HS) that are
being followed in the current literature. First, an ‘on-
tological model’ is set in the background of an ‘oper-
ationally’ defined theory whose primitives are prepara-
tion and measurement procedures. The goal of an op-
erationally defined theory is to prescribe the probabili-
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2ties of different outcomes of measurements, given vari-
ous preparation procedures. An ‘ontological model’ of
an operational theory is one whose primitives are proper-
ties of microscopic systems. In such a model a prepa-
ration procedure is assumed to prepare a system with
certain properties, and measurements are supposed to re-
veal something about these properties. An ‘ontic state’ in
such a model is defined as a complete prescription of the
properties of a system, and is denoted by λ. The space
of such ontic states is denoted by Λ. It is assumed that
even when an observer knows the preparation procedure
P , she may not know the exact ontic state that is pro-
duced by this preparation procedure, and assigns over Λ
a probability distribution µ(ψ|λ) to each quantum state
ψ with µ(ψ|λ) > 0 and an ‘indicator (response) func-
tion’ ξ(ψ|λ) to each state ψ such that the Born rule is
reproduced [16]:∫
dλ ξ(φ|λ)µ(ψ|λ) = |〈φ|ψ〉|2, (1)∫
dλµ(ψ|λ) = 1. (2)
According to HS, an ontological model can be clas-
sified as (i) ψ-complete which is ψ-ontic, (ii) ψ-
supplemented which is also ontic but incomplete, and
(iii) ψ-epistemic which is ψ-incomplete. The ψ-
complete model makes the identification Λ = CP(H)qm,
the complex projective Hilbert space of quantum me-
chanics, and prescribes µ(ψ|λ) = δ(λ − ψ). There are,
however, two different ways, according to HS, in which
an ontological model can be incomplete. It can be ontic
and yet incomplete if additional variables (collectively
labeled by ω) are required to complete the theory, as in
hidden variable models. In such cases, Λ = (ψ, ω) and
the quantum state is termed ψ-supplemented. Another
way in which the quantum state can be incomplete is
when an ontic state λ corresponds to two or more quan-
tum states ψ and φ corresponding to two distributions
µ(ψ|λ) and µ(φ|λ) over Λ with a non-zero overlap ∆. In
this case, an ontic state in ∆ does not encode the quan-
tum state which can therefore be regarded as epistemic,
i.e. mere knowledge. According to HS, Einstein favored
this interpretation of the quantum state.
Below, we will show how to rule out ψ-epistemic on-
tological models within the HS definition. Now we state
one of the main result as a theorem.
Theorem-I ψ-epistemic ontological models that satisfy
the Born probability rule given by conditions (1) and (2),
with distributions µ(ψ|λ) > 0 in open sets Λψ for all ψ
are inconsistent with the Schro¨dinger evolution.
Proof.– Let |ψ〉 and |φ〉 be two distinct non-orthogonal
epistemic states corresponding to an ontic state λ in the
overlap region ∆ = µ(ψ|λ) ∩ µ(φ|λ) with ∆ an open
interval in Λ. Consider the quantum state |ψ(t)〉 ∈ H at
time t which satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
= H|ψ(t)〉, (3)
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system. Invoking the
Born rule in the ontological model and putting |φ〉 =
|ψ(t)〉 in Eqn. (1), one obtains∫
dλ ξ(ψ(t)|λ)µ(ψ(t)|λ) = 1. (4)
By definition the response function satisfies
ξ(ψ(t)|λ) = 1 ∀λ ∈ Λψ (5)
and 0 elsewhere, where Λψ = {λ|µ(ψ(t)|λ) > 0}. Note
that we require µ(ψ|λ) > 0 to avoid µ(ψ|λ) = 0 for
some values of λ ∈ ∆, because the response function
ξ(ψ|λ) need not be unity for such values [11].
Now consider two distinct quantum states |φ〉 =
|ψ(t + dt)〉 and |ψ〉 = |ψ(t)〉. Then, by working to
leading order in dt, we have |〈ψ(t + dt)|ψ(t)〉|2 =
1− dt2~2 (∆H)2ψ where (∆H)2ψ = 〈ψ|(H−〈H〉ψ)2|ψ〉,H
being the Hamiltonian generating the unitary time evolu-
tion, and 〈H〉ψ = 〈ψ|H|ψ〉. Note that for a quantum
state to evolve in the projective Hilbert space a necessary
and sufficient condition is that it should have a non-zero
speed v, where v is defined as v = dDdt =
2(∆H)ψ
~ and
dD is the infinitesimal Fubini-Study metric over the pro-
jective Hilbert space [17, 18]. The infinitesimal distance
as measured by the Fubini-Study metric on the projective
Hilbert space is defined as
dD2 = 4(1− |〈ψ(t+ dt)|ψ(t)〉|2 = 4dt
2
~2
(∆H)2ψ. (6)
Thus, the energy fluctuation (∆H)ψ drives the quantum
state in CP (H). However, from Eqn.(1) we have∫
dλ ξ(ψ(t+ dt)|λ)µ(ψ(t)|λ)
=
∫
dλ
[
ξ(ψ|λ) + dξ(ψ|λ) + 1
2
d2ξ(ψ|λ) + · · ·
]
µ(ψ(t)|λ)
= 1 (7)
because the indicator or response function ξ(ψ|λ) is con-
stant over Λψ (Eqn.(5)) and does not have any explicit ψ
or t dependence, resulting in dnξ(ψ|λ) = 0∀n. This
contradicts Eqn. (1) and completes the proof.
Thus, even though Eqns (1) and (2) can reproduce the
probabilistic predictions at any given time, it cannot re-
produce the predictions of the Schro¨dinger time evolu-
tion at later times. This is an alternative proof of the
3no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic models. The theorem is a
consequence of the ψ-epistemic states having continuous
Hamiltonian evolution but not the indicator or response
functions. Furthermore, since the ontic states in ∆ do
not encode the epistemic states, evolution of the latter do
not reflect any evolution of the former. We should add
that the proof of Theorem-1 is based on the analyticity of
ξ(ψ|λ) in the open set Λψ . Epistemic models that do not
satisfy this condition are not covered by the theorem.
An alternative ontological model.– Ontological models
are supposed to reflect closely the underlying reality that
our physical theories are supposed to describe. However,
quantum mechanics has been riddled with the measure-
ment problem and nonlocality, features that one would
like to avoid in an ontological model. We show in
this letter that this objective can be met by (i) assign-
ing a complex projective Hilbert space structure CP(H)
to the ontic space in which the projective Hilbert space
CP(H)qm is embedded, and (ii) changing the definition
of ψ-epistemic from the one given by HS. We will illus-
trate these ideas in greater detail below. The ontic states
in this larger space will be denoted by |λ〉 and we will
refer to them as “hidden-states”. For simplicity, we con-
tinue to use the same notation Λ for our ontic space as
in the previous section, though our ontic space is differ-
ent from that in the HS framework, and the two ontic
spaces are logically different. The most important dif-
ference is that the HS model is based on an ontic space
Λ constructed from probabilities which satisfy the Born
rule, whereas our ontological model is based on prob-
ability amplitudes, and quantum states are averages of
“hidden” ontic states.
Alternative Definition of ψ-epistemic The definition of
epistemic states given by HS and adopted by all subse-
quent authors with some variations leads to contradic-
tions with standard quantum mechanics, as we proved in
Theorem-I above. Hence, to see if ψ-epistemic models
can still be saved, it is necessary to change the techni-
cal definition of ψ epistemic given by HS. According to
them, the basic definition is that ‘ψ has an ontic character
if and only if a variation of ψ implies a variation of reality
and an epistemic character if and only if a variation of ψ
does not necessarily imply a variation of reality.’ The on-
tic models satisfy this definition by having a one-to-one
correspondence between ψ and λ. Epistemic states must
avoid such a relationship. One way out is to have mul-
tiple distinct quantum states compatible with the same
ontic state λ, a choice made by HS. An alternative would
be to define a quantum state ψ as an average over mul-
tiple distinct ontic states λ with a probability amplitude
that can change on obtaining new information about the
ontic state. This is a Bayesian approach which we adopt.
Both these choices imply that a single ‘ontic state λ does
not encode ψ’, and furthermore, that a single ‘quantum
state does not parametrize the ontic states of the model
at all’. A hidden variable model and its generalizations,
on the other hand, are characterized by the ontic space Λ
parametrized by ψ and supplementary variables ω. We
will avoid such an option.
To see how our scheme works, let us first denote a
basis M of CP(H)qm whose elements are constructed
from the set of quantum states {|ψ〉}. Next, let us as-
sume that distinct (orthogonal) elements of {|ψ〉} corre-
spond to non-overlapping, non-empty dense sets {|λ〉} ∈
Λ = CP(H). This requires a partitioning P of Λ into
subsets λ corresponding to all possible distinct quantum
states which cover Λ: ∅ 6⊂ P, ⋃λ = Λ, λa ∩ λb =
∅, λa, λb ∈ P, a 6= b. This means that, for every prepa-
ration procedure Pψ , there is a unique quantum state |ψ〉
but a dense open set of ontic states λψ with the proba-
bility amplitude A(λ|Pψ) ∀λ ∈ λψ , the quantum state
being an average of the “hidden-states” over A(λ|Pψ)
(the propensity function) defined by
|ψ〉 =
∫
λψ
dλ|λ〉A(λ|Pψ) (8)
with the requirement
〈ψ|ψ〉 =
∫
λψ
dλP (λ|Pψ) = 1, (9)
where we have put |A(λ|Pψ)|2 = P (λ|Pψ). Thus,
P (λ|Pψ) is a probability density over the ontic space.
This ensures that all quantum mechanical predictions are
reproduced. In particular, we have
|〈φ|ψ〉|2 =
(∫
λψ∩λφ
dλA∗(λ|Pφ)A(λ|Pψ)
)2
, (10)
where |φ〉 is non-orthogonal to |ψ〉, and λψ ∩ λφ 6= ∅.
This is the Born rule for the transition probability be-
tween two quantum states.
Note that this description not only reproduces the Born
rule, it also reproduces the amplitudes for quantum tran-
sitions, which is not possible in the conventional onto-
logical models. In the limit of the widths of the ontic
state sets {λ}, corresponding to uncertainties of knowl-
edge, shrinking to points, one recovers the ψ-complete
model. It is in this sense that ψ is incomplete and epis-
temic (mere knowledge) in this model. Since it is not
ruled out by Theorem-I, we will refer to this model as a
consistent “minimalist ψ-epistemic” model.
It is worth emphasizing that barring the ψ-complete
model, in all ontological models considered so far, one
obtains averages of physical observables over some ‘hid-
den variables’, and there is no direct relationship between
4these and the quantum states. We have prescribed a def-
inite relationship between a quantum state and an open
dense set of ontic states |λ〉 ∀λ ∈ λψ given by (8). The
ontic states |λ〉 may thus be called ‘hidden states’. In
this sense the epistemic quantum states are somewhat
smeared descriptions of the ontic states.
Locality.– We will now explain how the ‘minimalist ψ-
epistemic’ model is consistent with the locality principle.
The origin of the debate on nonlocality in quantum me-
chanics can be traced back to Einstein’s observations at
the 1927 Solvay Conference. Consider the case of a sin-
gle particle wavefunction suggested by him to demon-
strate that an ontic wavefunction ψ describing the par-
ticle and locality are incompatible [19]. After passing
through a small hole in a screen, the wavefunction of the
particle spreads out on the other side of it in the form
of a spherical wave, and is finally detected by a large
hemispherical detector. The wave function propagating
towards the detector does not show any privileged direc-
tion. Einstein observes:
If |ψ|2 were simply regarded as the proba-
bility that at a certain point a given parti-
cle is found at a given time, it could hap-
pen that the same elementary process pro-
duces an action in two or several places on
the screen. But the interpretation, according
to which the |ψ|2 expresses the probability
that this particle is found at a given point,
assumes an entirely peculiar mechanism of
action at a distance, which prevents the wave
continuously distributed in space from pro-
ducing an action in two places on the screen.
Einstein later remarks that this ‘entirely peculiar mecha-
nism of action at a distance’ is in contradiction with the
postulate of relativity.
An advantage of a consistent ψ-epistemic ontologi-
cal model is that a sudden change or collapse of the
wavefunction can be interpreted as a Bayesian updating
on receiving new information, thus avoiding nonlocal-
ity. To see this clearly, we will follow the line of ar-
gument constructed by Norsen [20]. Let A and B be
any arbitrary pair of disjoint points on the detector. The
entangled state of the particle and the detector is then
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|ψ〉A|χ〉A+ |ψ〉B |χ〉B ] where |ψ〉 and |χ〉 de-
note the particle and the detector states respectively. In
the ψ-complete model, there is a unique λ = Ψ. In the
consistent ψ-epistemic model, on the other hand, the two
terms can be taken to correspond to two disjoint elements
λA, λB ∈ λΨ.
We are now in a position to state and prove Theorem-II
which addresses the question of locality.
Theorem-II In an ontological model, ψ-complete and
locality are incompatible, while in the consistent epis-
temic model, ψ-epistemic and locality are compatible.
Proof.– The probability of simultaneous detection of the
particle at A and B in the ψ-ontic model is given by
p(1A ∧ 1B |λ) = p(1A|λ)p(1B |1A, λ). (11)
The locality assumption requires that we must have
p(1B |1A, λ) = p(1B |λ). Hence, using λ = Ψ, we have
p(1A ∧ 1B |Ψ) = p(1A|Ψ)p(1B |Ψ) = 1
4
, (12)
which is inconsistent with the quantum mechanical pre-
diction that this probability vanishes. Hence, the locality
assumption is false in this model.
Now consider the consistent ψ-epistemic model in
which λ = {λA, λB} ∈ λΨ and λA ∩ λB = ∅. The
probability of simultaneous detection of the particle at A
and B is
p(1A∧1B |λA∧λB) = p(1A|λA∧λB)p(1B |1A, λA∧λB).
(13)
In this model the locality condition requires p(1A|λA ∧
λB) = p(1A|λA) and p(1B |1A, λA ∧ λB) =
p(1B |λA) = 0. Hence,
p(1A ∧ 1B |λA ∧ λB) = p(1A|λA)p(1B |λA) = 0 (14)
which is consistent with the quantum mechanical predic-
tion. Hence, this model is compatible with the locality
assumption. This completes the proof of the theorem.
We may remark that the “hidden states” do play a role
in the situation considered by Einstein. Indeed we can
say that one of these states is revealed by the measure-
ment. The spherical wavefunction ψ is an average over
these states with a uniform probability amplitude, each
point on the sphere corresponding to an ontic state in
the dense subset λψ which represents the uncertainties
on preparation of the state. When a spot appears on the
detector, it reveals the corresponding ontic state–thereby
one can say that the measurement removes the uncertain-
ties. The “hidden states” introduced in this paper also
clearly demarcates the difference with the hidden vari-
ables which lie hidden forever.
Concluding remarks.– We have proved that ψ-epistemic
ontological models based on positive definite probabil-
ity distributions and everywhere differentiable response
functions satisfying the Born rule specified by condi-
tions (1) and (2) are inconsistent with Schro¨dinger evo-
lution (Theorem-I). Thus, the ontological models with
ψ-epistemic wavefunctions, though they can reproduce
measurement results at a fixed time, are silent about dy-
5namical aspects. This impelled us to look for an alterna-
tive ontological model which can accommodate an epis-
temic interpretation of the quantum state. An epistemic
interpretation is preferable because it can do away with
many conundrums of quantum theory such as measure-
ment and nonlocality. Accordingly, we postulate that the
ontic space is a complex projective Hilbert space CPH
that embeds CPHqm and that is partitioned into disjoint
open dense sets. The quantum states appear as aver-
ages over these “hidden states” in the larger ontic space.
This makes quantum mechanics a somewhat smeared but
fairly close description of the underlying reality. Within
this framework, the epistemic interpretation is shown to
be consistent with locality (Theorem-II). We believe that
although the HS definition of epistemic states is inspired
by Einstein’s views, it is our definition that achieves
his objective. We hope that the minimalist ψ-epistemic
model presented here can provide new insights to the na-
ture of quantum states.
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